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Introduction
While the Indian armed forces are one of the largest in the world, they are arguably not the most technologically advanced. Since independence geopolitical and economic factors shaped India's military growth and by the end of Cold War India found itself operating more than 70% of the Soviet legacy equipment. The fall of the Soviet Union was a great setback for Indian military as it found it extremely difficult to maintain the near obsolescent Russian equipment or to upgrade it. The spread of globalization after the Cold War saw the rise of Asian economies, prompting critics to label the 21 st century as the 'Asian Century'. 2 Indian economic turnaround was dwarfed only by China's prodigious economic rise. In consonance with Michael
Beckley's theory, China's military power and effectiveness increased in the same proportion.
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The tilt of military balance in China's favor fueled India's sovereignty fears and acted as a catalyst for the much-required modernization of the Indian military. However, India did not mimic China and capped its defense budget to a meager 2.5% of its GDP over the years. 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Def Exp 20.23 23.07 23.95 28.25 33 38.72 46.09 49.63 47.21 47.4 % of GDP 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 Indian Defence Budget 1. 4 India is poised to spend $250 billion over the next decade on defense and thus be the largest importer of arms globally in the foreseeable future.
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The US, an undisputed ruler of the defense export market in the past decade, should logically have a lion's share of the Indian market. However, Russia is still touted as the largest arms exporter to India. The cost advantage of procuring a Russian equipment and the legacy of Russian systems, making it faster to own and operationalize than any equipment from other countries, has defense analysts in the US skeptical of achieving success in the Indian market.
Added to this is the Indo-US love-hate relationship vs. the Indo-Russian bonhomie. Instead, this paper argues that India has diversified its defense procurement policy in keeping abreast with the global realities; it's standing in the world order, and its security concerns. Today the competition for Indian defense contract is wide open, and the Russian advantage in Indian defense market is just a myth. The US has to act now and play its cards well in the competitive scenario, or else it might loose to Israel, France, and even Russia.
Thesis
This research paper uses a qualitative approach to argue that India has a contemporary defense procurement procedure favoring no single player. The country that alleviates India's security concerns by investing in Indian defense sector as a friendly partner and has the patience to deal with India's bureaucracy is likely to bag a large chunk of Indian defense expenditure.
India's Defense Procurement -Background
The Nehruvian Era Independent India's early years were influenced by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, and his dreams of a modern India. 6 The budget had inherited a revenue deficit of $78.5 and the forced defense expansion in the interim period. 7 Nehru's India inherited a meager defense structure and depended heavily on the British for its equipment while Canada and the US supplied only a handful vehicles. 8 India had a limited shipbuilding capability, virtually no aircraft industry, and rudimentary ordinance manufacturing units. Given India's predicament, Nehru had to choose between India's defense preparedness and his dream of modern, vibrant and industrialized India. He chose the latter due to his conviction that a free India was secure against external attack either by its geostrategic position, its size or the balance of power. 9 The pursuance of a non-aligned foreign policy was Nehru's tactic of using the goodwill of both super powers in India's progress.
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Nehru held to his anti-militarism despite the conflict that followed independence and obligated the Indian government to abide by the Blackett report. After three wars in just two decades, Indian leaders realized that peace was not possible in their backyard without the backing of the major powers. However, the traditional western friends, Britain, and the US were not interested to back India. Therefore, to safeguard its sovereignty and enhance military capacity the only option India had was to befriend the USSR.
However, it was pure economics that finally tilted the balance in favor of the USSR. Firstly, India's quest of self-reliance was to be realized with the MiG-21 deal, where Soviets promised transfer of technology and help to build its nascent aircraft industry. Secondly, by 1960s Indian economy was in its worst crisis post-independence and India could ill afford costly western equipment in hard currency. Thirdly, Soviets allowed India to modernize and expand the armed forces by selling tanks, ships, aircraft, and other equipment at an extremely favorable terms.
Instead of US dollars, trade was done in local currencies (Ruble and Rupees). Russia had extended a State credit of rubles payable in rupees with a grace period of seven years before payments began and a total repayment period of 17 years. 18 The Soviets charged only a meager 2.5% rate of interest. Fourthly, the repayment of principal and payment of interest was made in non-convertible rupees that were then utilized by the Soviet authorities for importing Indian goods. 19 The circle thus created helped boost the flagging Indian economy and the adage of "MiGs for food" could aptly describe the Indian defense procurement.
Even with such dependence, India was not a de-facto Warsaw Pact member, India remained steadfast on its non-aligned policy and Indo-Russia trade was purely necessity based. China during the same period. Given India's stressed relations with China, it became necessary for India to spruce up its defense. Lack of Indian defense industry, its massive modernization plans, and armed with deep pockets made many western countries make a beeline for India.
However, Israel was the biggest beneficiary of India's military modernization, both financially and politically.
India's story turned another chapter with it going nuclear in 1998. India was accepted as a peaceful nuclear state by the international community after an initial adverse reaction. However, the defining moment of India's acceptance as a responsible state in the world order, opening the doors for Indian defense, was India's exemplary handling of the Pakistani 'Kargil' misadventure.
Unexpected support for India in the form of President Clinton's actions during this testing time helped thaw US-India relations after several decades. 21 Thus, opening the opportunity for better defense ties and trade between the two countries.
India's Defense Procurement -Present
Initially, India's defense procurement was sporadic, subjective, and secretive due to the focus on industrial development, inadequate finances, inability to access western equipment, and a nonexistent indigenous defense industry. In fact before 1985, almost all defense deals were carried out with the erstwhile Soviet Union on a 'government to government' basis. 22 Third party agents thrived in the shadows cast by nontransparent defense expenditure, and only they brokered deals outside the Soviet umbrella albeit with massive kickbacks. However, in March 1986, a $1.4 billion contract between the Indian government and Swedish arms company AB against the alleged kickbacks resulted in a historic loss for the ruling Congress party in 1989 general elections. As a result, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Lok Sabha 1989, in its report recommended that the Indian government draw up comprehensive guidelines with regards to negotiations and implementation of defense contracts. 24 The Ministry of Defence (MOD), in February 1992, for the first time issued guidelines for all procurements involving an outlay of ₹10 million or more. 25 These guidelines were commonly called the Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP) 1992. The DPP tried to bring in objectivity in the procurement process while confirming to transparency, probity, and public accountability as required by PAC. However, it took the MOD about a decade to fructify the proposed DPP since it involved overhauling the existing defense procurement structures.
However, by 2001 the changing global environment necessitated a review of DPP 1992.
Accordingly, the MOD published a revised DPP in December 2002. Since then, the scope of these procedures has been revised and enlarged through periodical reviews resulting in the promulgation of the DPP 2003 DPP , 2005 DPP , 2006 DPP , 2008 DPP , 2011 DPP , and 2013 The major focus of the latest DPP is to balance the urgent requirements of the military, developing a robust indigenous defense sector and conforming to the highest standards of transparency, probity, and public Control (LAC) could be one of the reason for fast tracking direct sales. 38 However, appeasement of the US after its loss in MMRCA deal and accruing greater strategic benefits from the US could be the major influencing factors in this decision. Warming up to the US against Russia's liking shows the importance India places on this relationship. Another reason for such procurements could be India's realization of the might of its purse and its rights as a consumer.
India's new mantra seems to be 'Shop the best, at the best bargain, and with the best after sales service', and is akin to the way anyone would buy a new car.
Impediments to Indo-US Defense Relations
To establish a firm foothold in India's defense market, arguably the biggest for the foreseeable future, the US needs to understand what impedes its in-depth access. The major issues acting as retarders in the Indo-US relations are as follows.
There is a common perception that US lacks commitment in its relationship with India.
The seeds of this mistrust were sowed during the Indo-Pak war 1965, when the US sided with Pakistan, arousing strong anti-US sentiments and later the US support to Pakistan in the 1971
war. 39 The US interference in India's 'Kashmir' issue and their hesitancy to support India in international forums against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism has only deepened the crevasse. India feels that the US policy of 'with us or against us', in securing its national interests, challenges India's right of non-alignment. However, the real reason for India's apprehension seems to be the US history of punitive sanctions against some partners. A few decades ago, the US sold its most advanced fighter of the time, F14, to Iran under the Shah. A regime change in Iran led to crippling US sanctions that made the Iranian F-14 fleet ineffective in combat. 40 India's shopping frenzy in a drive to modernize its military has received a cold shoulder response from the US. The US seems to treat India as a tertiary market by offering equipment nearing its technological obsolescence. The Hawk XXI missile and the F-16IN aircraft offer represents a major effort to bring an obsolete weapon system to relevance in modern battle by stretching old technology through the application of fixes to make it relevant. 41 Another gray area between the two countries is Transfer of Technology (ToT). The US has traditionally been hesitant in ToT while it is almost a prerequisite in India's future inductions. This US quagmire has riddled the 'Javelin' anti-tank missile procurement. 42 The US hesitancy is not understood by India as it has no global aspirations and its insistence for ToT is a means to achieve self-reliance in defense. Lastly, the US readiness to supply Pakistan with same or comparable military equipment has irked Indian politicians since the Nehruvian era. 43 The biggest hurdle for the US in doing business with India is the bureaucratic red-tapism.
Having the 85 th position (out of 175) in the Corruption Perception Index -2014 does not bolster India's image for doing business. 44 Even though Mr. Narendra Modi, present prime minister, has declared "No red tape, only red carpet, is my policy towards investors", 45 it is going to be a slow process. Another factor that frustrates the US is the inherent time-consuming procurement process, which could prove disastrous in the volatile politico-economic world scenario, as well as the increasingly volatility of the South Asian region.
The Way Ahead for the US Primacy of the US national security interests should always be the driving factor in any US involvement with India. However, having said that, there are many 'lines of operation' US can operate on to engage India to further its national interests, strategically and economically.
India seems a right choice in the Asian region to advance the US interests against China, the only threat to US hegemony. Therefore, the US needs to nurture a long term responsive relationship with India. By delinking India and Pakistan on any and all bilateral issues, the US could address India's apprehension about Pakistan's prominence to the US, laying the ground for a healthy relationship. Post-9/11, the US has tried to revisit US-Pak relations, but ties with Pakistan are too intertwined and important at this moment to permit the sort of delinking that India seeks. President Obama's initiatives to engage India since 2008 have borne fruit with India reciprocating in kind through a flurry of defense contracts, amounting more than $8 billion.
Delinking defense procurements from political alignment would be a significant step in forging lasting security ties. Unlike the US, India is comfortable in supporting a particular country on one issue while vehemently opposing the same country on another matter and yet continue with defense procurement of essential items. India accepted Israel as a nation in 1950, but also stood behind Palestine at the UN. There were closed-door security ties even before India opened full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. 46 Thus, India has shown its ability to disentangle politics and national security. The same cannot be said for the US, as the unique relationship between the President and the Congress in policy matters makes it extremely difficult. However, the US and India can jointly evolve a mechanism to undertake supply of critical spares during any unforeseen political crisis.
As stated earlier, JVs offer a 'fast pass' access to the Indian defense deals but the US is averse to such concept. However, in the recent years sequestration has threatened many ambitious defense projects. India's unblemished record of strict adherence to laid down rules, no country has ever accused India of violating or misusing ToT terms, could make it a logical partner in particular defense programs. India paying Russia to supply arms to Afghanistan rather than sell the same should instill confidence in the US. 47 The first such JV could be the USAF F-35 program. Inclusion of India could give a fillip to the program marred by delays and uncertainties and be a welcome respite for IAF, especially when its FGFA program seems to be in trouble. 48 'Mars Orbiter Mission' that cost 1/10 th of the cost of NASA's 'Maven Mars Mission' has displayed India's prowess to achieve cost-effectiveness in high-end technology. 49 Therefore, co-development with India could allow the US to reduce development costs, tap additional technological expertise, and infuse capital to fast track new programs.
The US should take advantage of India's new mantra 'Make in India' and the new government's eagerness to attract FDI in the defense sector by laying a red carpet. Mr. Modi has shown his willingness to bypass all established procedures by inviting Japan to build six submarines in India at an estimated cost of $ 8.4 billion. To entice Japan Indian officials are also negotiating to acquire Japanese US-2i 'ShinMaywa' amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy.
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The US should exploit this backdoor route to Indian defense deals. Reduced red-tapism, preferential access to new defense deals, boosting the flagging US economy, and fostering a favorable public opinion are some of the immediate benefits accruing from this approach. The US companies are already outsourcing certain non-critical and minor components to Indian subsidiaries. India's cheap skilled labor and manufacturing costs will help pull down the overall cost the equipment, a win-win situation for the US, India, and the global defense market. Boeing 53 This adrenaline shot for the failing Russian economy against the wishes of the US could be the Indian gift for a needy partner. Obama's visit achieved more for the US although in the civil nuclear deal, with India relaxing the manufacturer liability clause. 54 Even the defense got some boost with the 'Raven' RPA deal during the same visit.
The US stands to benefit from engaging with India regularly especially in defense cooperation. Giving India its due as a responsible partner in the dealings would help cement a strategic relationship. The USAF could take the lead with its well-established organization, SAF/IA. SAF/IA's vision is to maintain and build cooperation, capability, and capacity with international partners. However, SAF/IA has focused on partner capacity and capability building.
With India, the approach should focus on cooperation especially increasing the interaction between forces. Such grass root level approach would pay more dividends, in the long run.
Conclusion
The global scenario has seen a gradual shift in the defense spending with the European countries cutting their defense budgets drastically. The reasons for this change could be the end of the cold war, the safety conferred by NATO, the global meltdown to name a few. At the same time, the emergence of Asian economies has seen India emerge as the biggest importer of defense equipment in the last few years. The trend is likely to continue in the near future, with India slated to spend more than $250 billion in the next decade on defense. 55 Today's sequestration era makes it more important for the US and Europe to have an arms sales relationship with India. But, India's long-term close ties with Russia and its legacy equipment (70%) would make any rational conclusion biased towards Russian monopoly. However, as argued in this paper, this is just a myth. India has matured as an open economy with contemporary defense procurement procedure. India has gradually distanced itself from Russia, against the wishes of many Indian defense analysts. 56 The result of this is the close relations developing between Pakistan and Russia. Thus, forcing India into a gullible position for forming long-term security partnerships with other players. 57 The US tactics of putting the right foot into the small opening before the window of opportunity closes seem to have worked. The US has, over the last couple of years, become the largest defense exporter to India with a total sale of $8 billion and more in the pipeline. However, these contracts represent the tip of the iceberg and the US needs to play its cards right if it does not want to loose out to Israel, France, and Russia.
